**Religion, welfare regimes and attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens' welfare. A European comparative analysis**

# Religion, welfare regimes and attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens' welfare. A European comparative analysis

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**Abstract**

The article aims to investigate the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes towards government responsibility for citizens' welfare. The rationale for such a relationship stems from the idea that religion and government spending can be intended as substitute mechanisms that may insure individuals against negative life events. We theorized the existence of an additional and opposite mechanism working in certain contexts: complementarity of responsibility. The local solutions provided by Church organizations and state interventions are not always perceived to be in opposition, but they can reinforce each other. In testing the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward

public support, we hypothesized a moderating impact of contextual features: the prevalent religious denomination in a country and the type of welfare state regime. Both may have indeed influence on citizens' opinions about the role of government responsibility because they contribute to shape individual preferences. To address these issues in a multilevel framework, we analyze the integrated European Value Study database for 31 European countries. Our results confirm that the different Christian doctrines, the various types of welfare state regimes, as well as the combinations of the two, shape differently the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward government responsibility.

**Keywords**: Religious practice, Welfare State, Public Attitudes, Role of Government, European Values Study

## Introduction

Religious institutions and state welfare systems are often intended as to perform the same functions in supporting the poor and deprived. A branch of literature maintains that religion can work as a coping strategy for individuals facing difficult life events by providing psychological as well as material support in the form of community assistance. Welfare state systems clearly do the same and this has led some scholars to interpret religion and the welfare state as substitutes. If this *substitution effect* is actually working, individuals who insure themselves through religion should be less favorable to high levels of social insurance by the state. For Christian Europe, this relationship is likely to be influenced – strengthened or weakened – by the national context. Regarding the latter, we argue that two major features can shape the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward government intervention for citizens' welfare. On the one hand, the prevailing religious denomination in a country (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox) can give completely

different meaning to reliance on forms of support other than the Church. On the other hand, the different types of welfare regime, which are based on very different models of solidarity, can also drive popular support for state intervention.

The analysis presented here deals with relationships among quite complex concepts (religiosity, Churches, welfare state), that an empirical operationalization based on secondary data cannot fully grasp. Accordingly, our considerations cannot be extended beyond the specific conceptual stance adopted here. Bearing this limitation in mind, we will test how the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens' welfare is moderated by these different features of the national context. We will first consider the distinction among the different Christian doctrines, moving afterwards to the different welfare regimes and then to a combination of the two. We will do so by applying a multilevel model to the last three waves of EVS data after excluding the non-Christian European countries. We expect that both macro-level characteristics play a role in shaping the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward government responsibility. Moreover, we argue that the differences between religious and non-religious are not necessarily generated by the *substitution effect* mechanism. Under specific configurations of welfare regime and religious denomination – where both state and church are viewed as responsible for providing for citizens – a *complementarity mechanism* might be at work. We will start by presenting the theoretical framework underlying our analysis and then move to the hypotheses. After introducing the data and the method we use, we will present the results and discuss them.

## 1. Theoretical Framework

The religious-secular cleavage in attitudes to welfare spending is under-investigated in political sociology. This is not surprising, given the dominant view that in modern and secularized Western societies religion plays only a minor role in shaping people's everyday

lives and opinions (Stegmueller *et al.* 2012). Thus, the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens' welfare has received little attention in the literature[1]. The reason for investigating this relationship stems mainly from the idea that religion and government spending can be considered as substitutes that insure individuals against adverse life events (Scheve and Stasavage 2006). Individuals who rely on religion to deal with their difficulties would not need the government's welfare provision and thus would be less inclined to support it. Consequently, religious individuals on average should prefer lower levels of social insurance provision than secular individuals. Seeing religion and public intervention as substitutes derives from the consideration that religion can work as a coping strategy for individuals facing difficult life events. As Immerzeel and Van Tubergen (2011) state, «religious ideologies provide people with predictable rules to help them cope with dangers and immediate problems». These positive effects of religion have been demonstrated by many studies. Religious individuals tend to have higher life satisfaction and subjective well-being (Ellison *et al.* 1989; Ellison 1991), lower incidence of depression (Park *et al.* 1990) and suffer from significantly lower losses in self-esteem after episodes like unemployment (Clark and Lelkes 2004). Moreover, being integrated into a religious group or community helps individuals to cope with adverse life events by providing them with both material and psychological support (Pargament 1997; 2002; Clark and Lelkes 2004; Scheve and Stasavage 2006; Brandt and Henry 2012). This role of religion in providing economic as well as psychological benefits to individuals facing situations of insecurity overlaps significantly with the same functions offered by welfare state programs. If one accepts that religion and welfare state programs have similar effects, and that both have costs, then individuals who insure themselves via religion «should logically prefer a lower level of insurance by the state» (Scheve and Stasavage 2006, 263)[2].

[1] We use attitudes toward government responsibility, attitudes toward public support, and attitudes toward state intervention as synonyms.

[2] This relationship between welfare state arrangements and (religious-based) informal solidarity can also be found in the literature under the name of *crowding out hypothesis*. The idea is that the welfare state tends to undermine less formalized solidarity practices where religious communities are

Churches historically provided some kind of social welfare prior to the evolution of the modern welfare state (Brodman 2009). As governments started to assume these welfare functions, individuals with elastic preferences started to think about the costs of their religious participation, as the desired welfare goods could also be obtained from secular sources (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004). This literature therefore suggests – as we mentioned earlier – a negative (substitution) effect: religious individuals are no longer likely to demand other kinds of social insurance because congregation members still receive benefits directly from religion (Scheve and Stasavage 2006, 262). This negative relationship has been shown in all the (few) investigations concerning European countries. Scheve and Stasavage (2006) found a negative cross-country relationship between religiosity and level of social spending and the same relationship is also present within countries: individuals who describe themselves as religious prefer lower levels of government spending than secular individuals. The same negative relationship is found by Stegmueller and colleagues (2012) when concluding that both Catholics and Protestants strongly oppose redistribution. As a matter of fact, none of these studies consider Orthodox countries. Ervasti (2009) and colleagues also investigated whether there is a religious factor involved in support for the welfare state in Europe. They found that religiosity has a clear effect on welfare state attitudes at the individual level. They consider the interaction with the general level of religiosity, which shows a very limited effect, and not the interaction with religious denomination (Ervasti *et al.* 2009).

The Catholic-Protestant cleavage investigated by Stegmueller and colleagues (2012) is seldom used to investigate European differences regarding attitudes toward the role of the state and its social policies. The sociological root of this thought is clearly inspired by the classic Weberian work on Protestantism. According to Weber (Weber 1930), when religious doctrine suggests that economic success is only a matter of individual merit, individuals may prefer lower levels of social insurance. On the Catholic side, by contrast,

considered as one particular form of social capital. However, there is no consensus that the welfare state crowds out other forms of private support (van Oorschot *et al.* 2005; Böhnke 2008).

it has often been emphasized that there is a strong link between the welfare policies adopted by the Christian Democratic parties and the Catholic tradition: such Catholic policies differ systematically from those pursued by Social Democratic parties (Esping-Andersen 1990). At first glance, this overlap between the Catholic tradition and Christian Democratic party policies can suggest a positive attitude toward state intervention or at least that Catholics may be less opposed to state intervention than Protestants (van Oorschot 2000; Kahl 2005). The facts, however, speak otherwise. The Catholic Church has always been averse to state intervention, preferring local solutions provided by Church organizations and based on the principle of subsidiarity. As a matter of fact, poor relief officials have always been mainly representatives of the clergy. On the contrary, Protestant church and state mutually reinforced themselves during the Reformation (Kahl 2005), but this positive relation disappeared when the modern state arose. In that period, the state took the upper hand in conflicts about moral authority and material resources (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and churches became only one organization among many.

This Catholic-Protestant cleavage has been found in some studies (Manow 2002; Kahl 2005) which pinpoint the differences between the two religious traditions in the timing and generosity of welfare policies (Stegmueller *et al.* 2012). However, it is possible that the processes of secularization Europe is experiencing can make this difference less salient, so that the most important cleavage in modern times is between secular and religious individuals rather than between Catholics and Protestants (Inglehart 1997; Olson and Green 2006; Stegmueller *et al.* 2012).

While focusing on the denominational differences between Catholicism and Protestantism, this debate seemed to have forgotten the third largest European confession: Orthodoxy. Given the absence of empirical studies, we can only offer an educated guess about the possible relation. This guess must be clearly based on the Communist past of most Orthodox-majority European countries. During the regime, religion was persecuted (Froese 2004; Tomka 2010) and the regime itself imposed a «politically forced secularization» (Meulemann 2004; Müller and Neundord 2012), leaving religion as the only source of

opposition (Tomka 2010). In the aftermath of the Communist dominion, the most obvious reaction was to bring religion back into the public debate. Most politicians and political forces started – and continue – to use Orthodoxy as a way to reconstruct a post-Communist identity and to legitimize their political power (Borowik 2002; Meulemann 2004). This clearly led to a strong interconnection between political government forces and Orthodox religion, though whether this corresponds to a positive attitude toward state intervention has yet to be demonstrated.

The discussion of religions' role in supporting or hindering (attitudes toward) government responsibilities should not be disjoint from the theorization put forward in the field of welfare state studies about the importance of welfare institutions for the legitimacy of social policies. Just as religions play a role in legitimizing (or not legitimizing) social policies, thus generating popular support among believers, so do welfare institutions. The concept underlying this idea is that of policy (or institutional) feedback. This concept captures a – possibly unintended – effect of welfare institutions which not only set constraints and opportunities for social actors, but can also contribute to shaping their preferences. This in turn generates and reproduces institutions' own legitimacy, influencing citizens' perceptions and opinions (Pierson 1993; Rothstein 1998; Mettler and Soss 2004). The same idea was expressed by Esping-Andersen (1990) when explaining differences among his three ideal-typical welfare regimes. He maintained that the goal of welfare states is to promote equality and establish institutionalized solidarity among citizens. In the long run, citizens' preferences will become aligned with the goals of the welfare state[3].

However, different welfare regimes have subscribed to different models of solidarity, i.e., they built their institutions and social policies around different principles of justice (Gelissen 2000; Arts and Gelissen 2001). The social-democratic welfare regimes emphasize universalistic solidarity and egalitarianism (equality of outcome) and through

[3] The genesis and development of welfare state institutions is strongly intertwined with the history of religious institutions and their relationships with the state in different nations. For analytical reasons, here we treat the influence of welfare state institutions and religious denominations separately, although we are fully aware that they are not completely independent factors.

large state interventions (*from cradle to grave*) aim for high de-commodification, i.e., independence of citizens from the market to meet their basic needs. By contrast, the liberal welfare regimes are based on the principles of equity and equality of opportunities (rather than outcomes), whereby citizens are themselves responsible for their own welfare and the market is considered to reward everyone according to their achievements and merits. Accordingly, the state maintains a residual role in granting only minimal support to the deserving poor. Midway between the liberal and the social-democratic regimes, there are corporatist (or conservative) regimes that emphasize solidarity within class, status, and family groups. As society's stratification is considered to be functional, the welfare state aims at preserving class and status differentiations. The degree of de-commodification strongly depends on an individual's position in the labor market (unemployment benefits and other kinds of social transfers are linked to occupations) and within the family (prominence of the male breadwinner model). Lastly, in the Mediterranean welfare regimes (Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997), the type of solidarity promoted by the state relies heavily on family bonds, and the welfare institutions working in this regime resemble those of the corporatist regimes, although they are underdeveloped and immature by comparison.

The former socialist countries currently elude a firmly established classification of their welfare institutions, which are now absent or largely underdeveloped. After the collapse of the communist regimes, these countries transitioned toward the market economy without replacing the kind of social provisions formerly ensured by the state. Scholars in the field of social policy have not reached a consensus on what directions former socialist countries' welfare policies are taking. In particular, it is still not clear whether these countries are moving toward one of Esping-Andersen's ideal-types or are developing distinct welfare regimes, which also depend on the influence that supranational institutions like the European Union, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank exert on former socialist countries' governments (Deacon 2000). Fenger's (2007) empirical analysis provides grounds for clustering former socialist countries in one group which is clearly

distinct from the other well-established welfare regime types – even if it shows substantial heterogeneity.

A hypothesis arising from the strand of sociological perspectives on the welfare state we have just outlined is that support for government intervention should vary systematically across welfare regimes, being higher in countries where the welfare state is more developed. Although this hypothesis has been subjected to extensive testing in comparative research (Svallfors 1997; Gelissen 2000; Andress and Heien 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2001; Linos and West 2003; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Jaeger 2006; 2009; Jordan 2013; Roosma *et al.* 2013; Calzada *et al.* 2014), the evidence was generally unsupportive. However, the *regime hypothesis* was not categorically rejected because much actually depends on how the dependent and independent variable (the regimes) are measured (Jaeger 2006; 2009).

That said, in social-democratic welfare regimes, the prevailing universalistic model of social solidarity assigns a paramount role to the state. Consequently, any non-governmental form of solidarity (like that stemming from religious institutions and communities) is likely to complement rather than substitute government intervention. Therefore, the religious cleavage should not be important in shaping attitudes toward government intervention in these countries. In liberal welfare regimes, as the role of the state is minimal, the role of religion in providing solidarity should naturally increase and qualify as a substitute for government intervention. However, given the modest role of government intervention, the trade-off for citizens between public insurance and insurance via religion could be relatively low. By contrast, in corporatist welfare regimes the benefits that can be accessed through government intervention are more substantial (so the stake is higher), but they are not framed in a model of universalistic solidarity as in the social-democratic regimes. Therefore, religion is more likely to qualify as a valid alternative to welfare state provision. In Mediterranean regimes, which have features similar to the corporatist regime, similar reasoning can apply. In former socialist countries, given their primitive or absent forms of welfare institutions, the role of religion could be similar to the one it has in liberal regimes,

i.e., a substitute for government intervention. However, these countries are characterized by the peculiar relationship between Church and State resulting from the historical vicissitudes of the Communist period. Nowadays the Church is perceived as the stakeholder of national integrity and the opponent of the former socialist system, and individual religiousness seems to be interwoven with national identity (Helander and Riegel 2009). For these reasons, we can expect a positive relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward government intervention.

## 2. Research question and hypotheses

To the best of our knowledge, no study has considered whether and to what extent individual religiosity affects attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens' welfare while taking religious denomination and type of welfare regime into account as moderator variables. In this connection, we argue that religiosity can have a positive, null or negative effect on individual attitudes depending on both the countries' predominant Christian denomination and the solidarity model underlying their welfare regimes. In testing this, we will look at both macro-features first separately and then jointly.

Regarding the first macro-level factor, prevalent religious denomination, we can expect that the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward public support is negative – due to the substitution mechanism – only in Catholic countries, where religious individuals should be less favorable to government intervention than non-religious individuals. In Protestant countries, the centrality of individual merit does not encourage either the principle of subsidiarity or state intervention. In this case, we can expect that individual religiosity does not affect attitudes toward government intervention. In Orthodox areas, by contrast, the strong interconnection between political government forces and religious authorities can result in a positive relationship between the two variables, and we would

expect to find that religious individuals ask for higher levels of government provision than secular individuals.

Regarding the welfare regime, we draw attention to the role of the state in protecting and promoting socio-economic well-being. We can expect that in countries where welfare generosity is particularly high or – vice versa – very low, the effect of individual religious practice on attitudes toward public support is small or null, as it is the solidarity model behind the welfare regime that is mainly relevant. Therefore, we can expect that individual religiosity should not affect citizens' attitudes toward public support in Social Democratic countries – where a strong egalitarian solidarity model is present – and in Liberal nations characterized by a residual conception of state intervention. In both Mediterranean and Corporatist contexts, we can expect that religiosity has a negative influence on attitudes toward government intervention, given that it reinforces the idea of a channel of solidarity other than the state. Finally, in the former socialist countries we can expect a positive effect of religiosity on attitudes toward government responsibility. In these contexts, the mutual support between religion and state in «burning the bridges» (Mitrokhin 1994) with the past can be so strong as to create a complementarity effect: both church and the government should ensure that everyone is provided for. If true, religious individuals are likely to appeal to the state for more intervention.

Although we presented them analytically as disjointed, the boundaries between these two macro-features are blurred and they can also combine in mediating the impact of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government responsibility. The resultant effect is therefore a matter of which effect prevails over the other. The expected effects of such combinations can be summarized as follows:

*Table 1 Here*

Table 1. Expected relationship between individual religiosity and attitude towards government intervention by country's prevalent religious denomination and welfare regime.

What we expect here is that the substitution effect between individual religiosity and attitudes toward state intervention can be reinforced or suppressed according to inherent features of the surrounding context. These features regard both the prevalent Christian denomination and the welfare regime, but the effects of the two can combine. Given the absence of a dominant religious culture, we hypothesize that the mixed countries relation is mainly driven by the related welfare regime.

## 3. Data and method

This study is based on the European Values Study longitudinal data file (ZA4804 version 3.0.0), a collection of four harmonized repeated cross-sectional surveys conducted in several European countries at approximately nine-year intervals (from 1981 to 2008). Given that the question used here as the dependent variable is available for three waves only (1990, 1999, 2008), we selected all the available data for those waves using the pooled approach (Firebaugh 1997). Although we are not interested in modeling variations across waves, having more data allows us to overcome robustness issues that inevitably arise when using only one wave. This strategy increases the proportion of individuals included in the analyses, whereas using only one wave of data could require an increase in the sample size for certain countries (Firebaugh 1997; Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2012). As for country selection, given our focus on Christian religious denominations, we discarded Muslim-majority countries (Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus and Turkey). In all, we kept 40 countries and 94 country-waves (as not all countries participated in all waves).

Multinational and multi-wave datasets like the EVS have a complex hierarchical structure. One of the most widely used and easiest ways to model the structure of these data is one in which individuals are nested within country-waves which are nested in turn within countries (Fairbrother 2014). However, this structure is most appropriate when the focus is

on the effects of time-varying macro-level variables, which is not our case. As we found that the three-level model does not yield results differing from a two-level model (individuals nested within countries), we report results from the simpler estimation. Moreover, as our research question deals with the varying relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward public support across contexts, we specified multilevel models with random intercept and random slope for religiosity.The dependent variable of the analysis is a question asking interviewees to place their opinion on a 1-10 scale whose extremes are the following statements: «Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves» (1), or «The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for» (10). What is captured by this question is clearly respondents' support for the general principle of state intervention for citizens' welfare rather than their support for the current welfare policies. In other words, it probes the dimension referring to the *goals* of the welfare state[4]. For ease of interpretation of regression coefficients, we treat this variable as numerical.

In operationalizing individual religiosity as the main micro-level independent variable, we created a dummy for attendance at religious services, setting the threshold of being religious to at least one service a month[5]. Scholars of the sociology of religion agree in defining individual religiosity as a strong multidimensional concept (Glock 1962). In particular, the dimensions of practice and belief are the most widely debated. This considered, the majority agrees that the focus on religious practice can be the most rigorous standard because it requires a commitment of time (McAndrew and Voas 2011, 3), partly

[4] Attitudes toward the welfare state are likely multidimensional and do not stem from one underlying general pro- or anti-welfare attitude, as several studies show (see, e.g., Roosma *et al.* 2013, Van Oorschot and Meulemann 2011). Our focus on the goal dimension is largely due to data availability. Other important dimensions concern the range, the degree, the efficiency/effectiveness and the outcomes. Nonetheless, a focus on the goals of the welfare state seems appropriate as we investigate whether or not the welfare state and religion are perceived to be substitutes in pursuing the same goal.

[5] Given the denominational heterogeneity of our sample, we opted for the monthly attendance threshold instead of the weekly attendance threshold. This is because Sunday Mass participation is a precept only of Catholicism and thus using this threshold for either Protestants or Orthodox would not be appropriate. The shortcoming here is to be more inclusive than usual on the Catholic side. In any case, given the widespread diffusion of the weekly attendance variable, we produced the same analyses as a robustness check using this threshold. Results are consistent and available on request.

because it is particularly effective for measuring the ritualistic dimension of individual religiosity (Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2014, 2). As our research is based on a sample of different denominations, cross-national comparability should be the main drive in building this variable. Accordingly, attendance is more likely to be considered equivalent across different countries and cultures whereas religious beliefs are less (Brenner 2016, 566). This is because the comparison of behaviors is more justifiable given the equivalence of units of time and the conceptual equivalence between traditionally Christian societies (Brenner 2016, 566). Also from the methodological point of view, the associated question (church attendance) is quite simple to formulate and easy to understand (Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2014), and it is present in every international survey (Brenner 2016, 566). In addition, other micro-level variables are used as controls for compositional effects across nations and waves. They are basic socio-demographic characteristics such as age (6 categories), gender (dichotomous), years of formal education (four levels), employment status (employed, retired, out of labor force, unemployed)[6], and marital status (dummy for married people).

The two macro-level independent variables are the prevalent religious denomination and the welfare regime. We built the variable concerning the prevalent religious denomination by summarizing the individual information gathered with the question 'Which religious denomination do you belong to?'. In cases where an unclear situation (high percentages – 25% or more – for two different denominations) is present, we coded the countries as 'mixed' (see Appendix). There are two different reasons for considering religious denomination as a macro, rather than micro, variable. On the one hand, we are interested in describing the religious context in which the relation between individual religiosity and attitude toward the welfare state takes place. On the other hand, results show the high denominational homogeneity within countries (with only a very few exceptions). Together, these two considerations effectively describe the setting of our research: a religious

[6] We avoided using information on occupation because it was not consistently collected across waves.

tradition which drives an individual relationship in which religious individuals are likely to belong to the country's prevalent denomination. Regarding the welfare regime types, we followed the usual classifications and identified Liberal countries (Great Britain and Ireland), Corporatist countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Switzerland), Social-democratic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and former socialist countries (Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine).

**4. Results**

Descriptive data on the main variables are summarized in Table 2. Individual religiosity, as represented by monthly attendance at religious services, presents a great deal of cross-country and cross-context variation. At one pole, we find the lowest religious service attendance in Social-democratic Protestant countries. In addition, France, Czech Republic, Estonia, Montenegro, and the Russian Federation also seem to be very secular with a percentage of churchgoers lower than 15%. At the other pole, the highest religious participation is found for Malta, Ireland, and Poland (over 70% of religious practitioners) and in general for all the Catholic-majority countries. Orthodox countries are placed somewhere in between Catholics and Protestants: religious practice is in fact moderately high, but high country variability is also present.

Moving to attitudes toward government intervention, as represented by self-placement along a scale of individual versus state responsibility for citizens' welfare, we see that the average opinion differs mainly according to the type of welfare regime. In fact, it should be noted that two groups of countries seem to emerge. On the one hand, we have Corporatist, Social-democratic and Liberal countries with lower support for state

intervention (always lower than 5). On the other hand, we have Mediterranean and former Socialist countries showing higher support (almost always higher than 5).

Beyond the average differences among countries, we focus on whether there is a relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward state responsibility and how it changes depending on the context. At a descriptive level, looking at the last three columns of Table 1, we can observe that attitudes toward state intervention can be quite different between religious and non-religious individuals. We found the wider – negative – gap in France, Germany, Denmark, Spain and Austria, where being religious means being less favorable towards government intervention. In general, this negative relation between religiosity and attitude toward redistribution seems to be present in all the Corporatist and Mediterranean Catholic countries except Belgium. Differences in the opposite direction are found instead in Estonia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland. In these former Socialist countries, individual religiosity is more often positively associated with attitudes toward state responsibility.

Though these descriptive results are interesting, testing our hypotheses calls for multivariate analysis to model the variability of these bivariate relationships as a function of social contexts.

*Table 2 Here*

Table 2. Descriptive statistics on attendance at religious services (%) and attitudes toward state responsibility (average score)

Source: Authors' calculations from EVS harmonized data (1990-2008). *: average score on a 1-10 scale where 1=individual responsibility, 10=state responsibility.

We estimated four models of the effect of religious practice on attitudes toward government intervention. Table 3 shows the results of the four multilevel regressions. In the first model, we included only individual level covariates, allowing the intercept and the coefficient of religious practice to vary across countries. The coefficient in this model reports the average

effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward state intervention (1-10 scale, higher scores indicating increasing support for «The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for»), with significant differences between countries. A negative coefficient means that religious individuals are less in favor of government intervention, net of socio-demographic controls (gender, age, marital status, etc.) that account for compositional effects.[7] From this model, we see that religious practice has no effect on average. However, the coefficient shows high variance (see random-effects parameters) which suggests that the effect might be very different among countries and contexts.

Starting from this finding, our subsequent models included macro-level variables interacted with religious practice. Model 2 considers the religious denomination, model 3 considers the welfare regimes, and model 4 takes into account both denomination and welfare regimes together. The interaction effects between the micro and the macro level show how the macro-level factors affect the strength of the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward state intervention, and also statistically explain the variance of the slope of religiosity. For ease of interpretation, the main results from these models have been reported graphically in Figures 1-3, which present the effects of individual religiosity according to the different country contexts. In model 2 (Figure 1), only the country's religious denomination was included. From this model, we found that religious practice has a negative effect in Catholic countries – meaning that religious individuals are less favorable to government intervention – and a positive effect in Orthodox countries, whereas in Protestant and Mixed countries the effect is null. In model three (Figure 2), we included interactions between religious practice and welfare regime type (without religious denomination). We found significant negative effects of religious practice only in Corporatist and Mediterranean countries and a positive effect in former Socialist countries.

*Table 3 Here*

[7] As our regression model aims to estimate the causal effect of individual religiosity, socio-demographic variables are considered only as controls and thus their coefficients cannot have a causal interpretation (Pisati 2010).

Table 3. Multilevel models of the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government responsibility.

To consider the combination of these two macro features, we estimated a fourth model with the interactions between religious practice and a combination of welfare regime and religious denomination (Figure 3). The pattern of these results is interesting because it reveals the interplay between welfare regime types and religious denominations in determining the effect of individual religious practice on attitudes. Social-democratic countries are only Protestant, so the effect of religious practice is the same we found in models 2 and 3 and is null. In Liberal countries, as they are both Catholic (Ireland) or Mixed (Great Britain), the effect is small and non-significant. For Ireland, the role of religious denomination is thus cancelled by the welfare regime context. In Corporatist countries, which are both Catholic or Mixed, religious practice has a negative effect. This means that the role of religion at macro-level is confirmed (Catholic countries) or overridden (in Mixed countries) by the type of welfare regime. Mediterranean countries are either Catholic or Orthodox. Among the former, religious practice has a negative effect; among the latter the effect is null, implying that the effects of religion and welfare regime cancel each other out. Former Socialist countries are perhaps the most interesting cases because they can be either Catholic, Mixed (Protestant-Catholic-Orthodox) or Orthodox. The effect of religious practice is small and non-significant in Catholic countries, strongly positive in Mixed countries and positive in the Orthodox ones. Therefore, it can be said that the role of the Catholic religion overrides the socialist heritage of these countries, whereas the Orthodox religion (which also is present in Mixed countries) reinforces it.

Finally, it should be noted that the variance of the coefficient of religious practice is strongly reduced (about halved) with the introduction of interactions with welfare regimes (model 3) or combinations of welfare regime and religious denomination (model 4). This finding can be interpreted as indicating that what mainly affects the relationship of interest is the welfare regime context, although relevant exceptions should not be disregarded.

*Figures 1-3 Here*

## 5. Summary and conclusions

In this article, we investigated the relationship between individual religiosity, as captured by church attendance, and attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens' welfare. The main body of literature suggested a substitution mechanism between religion and state such that religious individuals should prefer lower levels of state intervention. However, we theorized the existence of an additional and opposite mechanism working in certain contexts: complementarity of responsibility. The local solution provided by Church organizations and state interventions are not always perceived to be in opposition, but they can reinforce each other. In testing the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward public support, we hypothesized a moderating impact of contextual features. In particular, we considered two macro features such as the prevalent Christian denomination and the type of welfare regime within each Christian European country. In this connection this, we hypothesized that the supposed – negative – substitution effect is present only for Catholicism, whereas the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward government responsibility does not exist in Protestant countries or is positive in Orthodox countries. At the same time, we also hypothesized that such a relationship does not exist in social-democratic and liberal countries, is negative in Mediterranean and corporatist countries, and is positive in former socialist countries. The actual individual relationship can be thus negative, positive or null according to the joint moderating effect of welfare regime and religious denomination. We tested this explicitly using a combination of both, finding a negative relationship for the conservative Catholic and mixed countries and for the Mediterranean Catholic ones. On the other hand, we hypothesized a positive relationship for the former socialist Orthodox and mixed countries. The effect for all the other combinations was expected to be null and our findings were consistent.

As concerns denominational differences, Stegmueller and colleagues (2012) concluded that both Protestants and Catholics show about the same level of support for the principle of governmental income redistribution (i.e., the means of financing the welfare state). Starting from this, they maintained that the denominational cleavage between Catholics and Protestants is losing ground in favor of a more classical religious-secular cleavage and that the effect of this cleavage is comparable to the effect of income or education. Therefore, they argued that, although religious organizations may have lost their power in shaping policy making, religion continues to influence individual's attitudes «which are not restricted to questions of 'private morale'» (Stegmueller *et al.* 2012, 19).

Our results only partially confirm this.

First, the effects of individual religiosity that we found are not comparable in size to the differences by income or education (Table 3). When shaping individual preferences toward government responsibility, these two latter remain the stronger predictors. Even if we consider the effect of religiosity, the analysis of the macro context shows results that differ in part from those of Stegmueller and colleagues. In fact, our results show that the Protestant denomination, the social-democratic and the liberal welfare regimes cancel out the individual relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward state responsibility. In such countries, which are basically the Northern countries plus Ireland and the UK, the relationship does not exist. In countries where Catholicism (or a strong Catholic component) combines with corporatist (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France and Benelux) or Mediterranean (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Malta) welfare regimes, we found the substitution effect theorized by Stegmueller et al. (2012).

Conversely, an opposite effect emerged in countries where the socialist past (and the resulting welfare regime) combines with Orthodoxy. In such countries (Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia), religious individuals are more likely to support the principle of state intervention for citizens' welfare. In between these two latter groups, there are two clusters of countries for which the effects of religious denomination and

welfare regime basically cancel each other out. This is the case of Mediterranean Orthodox countries (Greece, Cyprus) and former-socialist Catholic countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia).

The relationships investigated in this article regard complex phenomena such as religion and welfare state. Their empirical operationalization requires simplifications that inevitably reduce the theoretical scope of the underlying concepts, particularly when the analysis is carried out within the boundaries of secondary data. Our findings therefore represent only a small portion of a big picture that could be viewed from other points of view. That said, what clearly emerges from our analysis is that the religious influence in shaping individual attitudes toward government responsibility is definitely not a matter of Protestantism and the social-democratic or liberal tradition. Catholicism seems to drive the substitution effect between religion and state, and this effect is reinforced in corporatist and Mediterranean countries. The communist past of the Eastern European countries seems to show a kind of overlap between religion and state authority, and this results in a positive relationship between religiosity and the principle of state intervention. This is reinforced by the Orthodox tradition, but nullified where Catholicism is the dominant religious tradition.

Considering these results, a few thoughts about the near future of the relation between religiosity and state intervention are in order. As many studies show, European religiosity is constantly declining (Brenner 2016) with only a few possible exceptions in some former communist countries (Greeley 2002; Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012; Tomka 2010). If this scenario is confirmed, the secularization processes Europe is experiencing will probably cancel out the substitution effect we found for Catholic countries (as that for Protestants is already null). The most interesting (and unexpected) development concerns instead the former communist Orthodox countries. Given the positive relation between religiosity and state intervention we found, if these countries are in fact an exception to the secularization pattern, the relation is likely to strengthen.

**Appendix**

Table A1. Religious denomination by country.

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Table 1. Expected relationship between individual religiosity and attitude towards government intervention by country's prevalent religious denomination and welfare regime.

| Welfare regime and religious denomination clusters | Expected relationship according to religious denomination | Expected relationship according to welfare regime | Relevant factors | Expected relationship according to both factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social democratic - Protestant | Null | Null | Both | Null |
| Liberal - Catholic | Negative | Null | Both | Null/Negative |
| Liberal – Mixed religion | | Null | Only welfare | Null |
| Corporatist - Catholic | Negative | Negative | Both | Negative |
| Corporatist - Mixed religion | | Negative | Only welfare | Negative |
| Mediterranean - Catholic | Negative | Negative | Both | Negative |
| Mediterranean - Orthodox | Positive | Negative | Both | Null |
| Former socialist - Catholic | Negative | Positive | Both | Null |
| Former socialist - Mixed religion | | Positive | Only welfare | Positive |
| Former socialist - Orthodox | Positive | Positive | Both | Positive |

Table 2. Descriptive statistics on attendance at religious services (%) and attitudes toward state responsibility (average score)

| Welfare regime and prevalent religious denomination | Country | Monthly attendance (%) | Attitudes toward state responsibility* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | All | Non-religious | Religious | Diff. |
| Social-Democratic - Protestant | Denmark | 10.76 | 4.48 | 4.52 | 4.18 | -0.34 |
| | Finland | 11.20 | 4.47 | 4.47 | 4.50 | 0.04 |
| | Iceland | 11.35 | 4.72 | 4.71 | 4.81 | 0.10 |
| | Norway | 12.26 | 4.67 | 4.66 | 4.75 | 0.09 |
| | Sweden | 9.18 | 3.91 | 3.89 | 4.11 | 0.22 |
| Liberal - Mixed | United Kingdom | 33.20 | 4.49 | 4.50 | 4.45 | -0.05 |
| Liberal - Catholic | Ireland | 73.27 | 4.53 | 4.58 | 4.51 | -0.07 |
| Corporatist - Catholic | Austria | 38.53 | 3.89 | 3.97 | 3.76 | -0.22 |
| | Belgium | 28.46 | 4.91 | 4.90 | 4.92 | 0.02 |
| | France | 13.48 | 4.25 | 4.33 | 3.75 | -0.58 |
| | Luxembourg | 24.05 | 4.47 | 4.49 | 4.40 | -0.09 |
| Corporatist - Mixed | Germany | 23.67 | 4.35 | 4.44 | 4.04 | -0.41 |
| | Netherlands | 27.17 | 4.73 | 4.71 | 4.77 | 0.06 |
| | Switzerland | 20.21 | 4.05 | 4.06 | 4.02 | -0.04 |
| Mediterranean - Catholic | Italy | 51.33 | 5.63 | 5.70 | 5.55 | -0.15 |
| | Malta | 86.04 | 4.93 | 5.02 | 4.91 | -0.11 |
| | Portugal | 49.18 | 4.74 | 4.81 | 4.69 | -0.12 |
| | Spain | 35.42 | 5.77 | 5.84 | 5.61 | -0.23 |
| Mediterranean - Orthodox | Cyprus | 55.61 | 4.81 | 4.81 | 4.80 | -0.01 |
| | Greece | 39.23 | 5.55 | 5.53 | 5.58 | 0.05 |
| F. Socialist - Catholic | Croatia | 45.48 | 5.16 | 5.09 | 5.23 | 0.14 |
| | Czech Republic | 12.57 | 4.67 | 4.63 | 4.82 | 0.19 |
| | Hungary | 17.95 | 5.84 | 5.84 | 5.83 | -0.01 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Lithuania | 27.78 | 5.33 | 4.97 | 5.33 | 0.36 |
| | Poland | 76.98 | 5.50 | 5.23 | 5.57 | 0.34 |
| | Slovak Republic | 46.76 | 5.61 | 5.49 | 5.75 | 0.26 |
| | Slovenia | 30.19 | 5.77 | 5.75 | 5.82 | 0.07 |
| F. Socialist - Orthodox | Armenia | 40.97 | 5.35 | 5.39 | 5.30 | -0.09 |
| | Belarus | 17.38 | 5.15 | 5.10 | 5.46 | 0.36 |
| | Bulgaria | 15.48 | 5.21 | 5.15 | 5.59 | 0.43 |
| | Georgia | 39.52 | 6.66 | 6.67 | 6.62 | -0.05 |
| | Macedonia | 24.98 | 5.78 | 5.68 | 6.14 | 0.46 |
| | Moldova | 30.65 | 4.66 | 4.64 | 4.68 | 0.03 |
| | Montenegro | 14.68 | 5.52 | 5.49 | 5.75 | 0.26 |
| | Romania | 43.11 | 4.56 | 4.44 | 4.73 | 0.29 |
| | Russian Federation | 11.55 | 5.68 | 5.67 | 5.84 | 0.16 |
| | Serbia | 21.35 | 5.30 | 5.33 | 5.20 | -0.14 |
| | Ukraine | 21.67 | 5.97 | 5.94 | 6.08 | 0.14 |
| F. Socialist - Mixed | Estonia | 10.66 | 5.46 | 5.33 | 6.28 | 0.95 |
| | Latvia | 15.23 | 6.19 | 6.05 | 6.23 | 0.18 |

Source: Authors' calculations from EVS harmonized data (1990-2008). *: average score on a 1-10 scale where 1=individual responsibility, 10=state responsibility.

Table 3. Multilevel models of the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government responsibility.

| | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | | | Model 4 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Sig. | Coef. | S.E. | Sig. | Coef. | S.E. | Sig. | Coef. | S.E. | Sig. |
| ***Fixed-effects parameters*** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Attending religious service at least once a month* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Religious practice | -0.02 | 0.04 | 0.69 | -0.12 | 0.06 | 0.05 | -0.03 | 0.10 | 0.72 | -0.04 | 0.09 | 0.69 |
| *Gender (ref. Female)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | -0.26 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.26 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.26 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.26 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| *Age band (ref. <25 y.o.)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Age 25-34 y.o. | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.65 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.64 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.62 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.63 |
| Age 35-44 y.o. | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| Age 45-54 y.o. | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Age 55-64 y.o. | -0.08 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.08 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.08 | 0.03 | 0.03 | -0.08 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Age >=65 y.o. | -0.17 | 0.04 | 0.00 | -0.17 | 0.04 | 0.00 | -0.16 | 0.04 | 0.00 | -0.16 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| *Marital status (ref. Non-married)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Married | -0.11 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.11 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.11 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.11 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| *Educational level (ref. Primary educ.)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Uncompleted secondary educ. | -0.17 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.17 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.17 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.17 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Secondary educ. | -0.40 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.40 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.40 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.40 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Tertiary educ. | -0.60 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.60 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.60 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.60 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| *Occupational status (ref. Employed)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Retired | 0.30 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Out of labor force | 0.17 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Unemployed | 0.54 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.54 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.54 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.54 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| *Wave (ref. Second)* | -0.16 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.16 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.16 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.16 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Forth wave | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Third wave | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.52 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 5.47 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 5.00 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 5.01 | 0.19 | 0.00 |
| *Country denomination (ref.: Catholic)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mixed | | | | -0.15 | 0.27 | 0.57 | | | | | | |
| Protestant | | | | -0.47 | 0.29 | 0.11 | | | | | | |
| Eastern Orthodox | | | | 0.40 | 0.21 | 0.06 | | | | | | |
| *Interactions: religious practice ** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mixed | | | | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.33 | | | | | | |
| Protestant | | | | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.51 | | | | | | |
| Orthodox | | | | 0.23 | 0.09 | 0.01 | | | | | | |
| *Welfare regime (ref.: Social-dem.)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal | | | | | | | -0.09 | 0.37 | 0.80 | | | |
| Corporatist | | | | | | | -0.14 | 0.26 | 0.60 | | | |
| Mediterranean | | | | | | | 0.72 | 0.27 | 0.01 | | | |
| Former socialist | | | | | | | 0.87 | 0.22 | 0.00 | | | |
| *Interactions: religious practice ** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal | | | | | | | -0.07 | 0.15 | 0.64 | | | |
| Corporatist | | | | | | | -0.24 | 0.12 | 0.04 | | | |
| Mediterranean | | | | | | | -0.20 | 0.12 | 0.10 | | | |
| Former socialist | | | | | | | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.08 | | | |
| *Welfare regime & country denomination (ref.: Social-dem. Protestant)* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal Catholic | | | | | | | | | | 0.00 | 0.48 | 1.00 |
| Liberal Mixed | | | | | | | | | | -0.18 | 0.47 | 0.71 |
| Corporatist Catholic | | | | | | | | | | -0.14 | 0.29 | 0.62 |
| Corporatist Mixed | | | | | | | | | | -0.12 | 0.31 | 0.69 |
| Mediterranean Catholic | | | | | | | | | | 0.71 | 0.29 | 0.01 |
| Mediterranean Orthodox | | | | | | | | | | 0.73 | 0.36 | 0.05 |
| Former soc. Catholic | | | | | | | | | | 0.75 | 0.25 | 0.00 |
| Former soc. Mixed | | | | | | | | | | 1.23 | 0.36 | 0.00 |
| Former soc. Orthodox | | | | | | | | | | 0.89 | 0.23 | 0.00 |
| *Interactions: religious practice ** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal Catholic | | | | | | | | | | -0.11 | 0.19 | 0.54 |
| Liberal Mixed | | | | | | | | | | -0.04 | 0.17 | 0.83 |
| Corporatist Catholic | | | | | | | | | | -0.24 | 0.12 | 0.04 |
| Corporatist Mixed | | | | | | | | | | -0.22 | 0.13 | 0.09 |
| Mediterranean Catholic | | | | | | | | | | -0.25 | 0.12 | 0.04 |
| Mediterranean Orthodox | | | | | | | | | | -0.06 | 0.16 | 0.71 |
| Former soc. Catholic | | | | | | | | | | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.27 |
| Former soc. Mixed | | | | | | | | | | 0.47 | 0.17 | 0.00 |
| Former soc. Orthodox | | | | | | | | | | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.08 |
| ***Random-effects Parameters*** | Estim. | S.E. | | Estim. | S.E. | | Estim. | S.E. | | Estim. | S.E. | |
| Country: Independent | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| sd(Religious practice) | 0.24 | 0.04 | | 0.21 | 0.03 | | 0.13 | 0.03 | | 0.12 | 0.03 | |
| sd(Constant) | 0.63 | 0.07 | | 0.56 | 0.06 | | 0.44 | 0.05 | | 0.42 | 0.05 | |
| sd(Residual) | 2.66 | 0.01 | | 2.66 | 0.01 | | 2.66 | 0.01 | | 2.66 | 0.01 | |
| N | 119490 | | | 119490 | | | 119490 | | | 119490 | | |

Figure 1. Estimated effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government intervention according to the prevalent religious denomination. Mean and 95% confidence intervals.




Source: Authors' calculations from EVS harmonized data

Figure 2. Estimated effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government intervention according to welfare regime. Mean and 95% confidence intervals.




Source: Authors' calculations from EVS harmonized data.

Figure 3. Estimated effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government intervention according to a combination of the prevalent religion denomination and welfare regime. Mean and 95% confidence intervals.




Source: Authors' calculations from EVS harmonized data.

## Appendix

Table A1. Religious denomination by country.

| | Self-reported belonging to a religious denomination (%) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Catholic | Protestant | Orthodox | Other | Not belonging |
| *Catholic countries* | | | | | |
| Austria | 75.9 | 5.6 | 0.6 | 3.3 | 14.5 |
| Belgium | 59.3 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 4.9 | 34.7 |
| Croatia | 81.8 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 14.7 |
| Czech Republic | 30.0 | 3.3 | 0.2 | 2.8 | 63.8 |
| France | 50.9 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 43.8 |
| Hungary | 40.3 | 13.4 | 0.1 | 2.4 | 43.8 |
| Ireland | 87.8 | 2.5 | 0.1 | 2.3 | 7.3 |
| Italy | 81.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 17.3 |
| Lithuania | 71.5 | 0.6 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 21.8 |
| Luxembourg | 62.6 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 5.7 | 29.6 |
| Malta | 96.8 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.9 |
| Poland | 92.8 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 4.3 |
| Portugal | 81.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 15.2 |
| Slovak Republic | 64.8 | 9.1 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 23.2 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Slovenia | 66.9 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 28.2 |
| Spain | 76.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 5.5 | 17.7 |
| *Mixed countries* | | | | | |
| Estonia | 0.8 | 11.2 | 11.5 | 1.8 | 74.7 |
| Germany | 27.5 | 31.8 | 0.3 | 2.6 | 37.8 |
| Latvia | 18.4 | 17.2 | 17.3 | 3.5 | 43.5 |
| Netherlands | 26.0 | 12.1 | 0.0 | 11.9 | 50.0 |
| Switzerland | 32.2 | 30.0 | 1.9 | 9.5 | 26.4 |
| United Kingdom | 18.3 | 37.1 | 0.2 | 15.1 | 29.4 |
| *Protestant countries* | | | | | |
| Denmark | 0.7 | 86.9 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 10.4 |
| Finland | 0.1 | 61.3 | 1.0 | 21.2 | 16.3 |
| Iceland | 1.1 | 88.2 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 4.9 |
| Norway | 1.5 | 78.6 | 0.3 | 4.6 | 15.0 |
| Sweden | 1.3 | 67.5 | 0.5 | 5.7 | 25.1 |
| *Orthodox countries* | | | | | |
| Armenia | 0.0 | 0.1 | 90.5 | 4.0 | 5.3 |
| Belarus | 7.9 | 0.6 | 54.4 | 0.9 | 36.2 |
| Bulgaria | 0.2 | 0.4 | 49.7 | 11.8 | 37.9 |
| Cyprus | 1.5 | 0.1 | 96.8 | 1.2 | 0.4 |
| Georgia | 0.3 | 0.0 | 90.8 | 7.4 | 1.5 |
| Greece | 1.0 | 0.0 | 93.8 | 1.6 | 3.5 |
| Macedonia | 0.4 | 0.1 | 73.8 | 18.9 | 6.9 |
| Moldova | 0.4 | 0.3 | 89.6 | 3.3 | 6.4 |
| Montenegro | 3.1 | 0.1 | 39.2 | 17.2 | 40.5 |
| Romania | 5.0 | 1.9 | 86.1 | 3.8 | 3.3 |
| Russia | 0.3 | 0.3 | 51.3 | 4.9 | 43.3 |
| Serbia | 5.3 | 1.2 | 59.8 | 3.8 | 30.0 |
| Ukraine | 5.4 | 2.1 | 46.3 | 15.1 | 31.0 |